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Abstract
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) existed as a peaceful country from its inception
following World War II until its dissolution which began in the late 1980s. By 1992, the country
ceased to exist, and wars had erupted throughout several former Yugoslav republics. In order to
determine how these events unfolded, this paper first seeks to analyze ethnic relations in Yugoslavia
following Tito’s death and secondly, how the deterioration among the country’s ethnic groups led to
war in the early 1990s. Using path dependency theory, this paper analyzes the changes in political
leadership with case studies of three Yugoslav republics and the Semi-Autonomous Region of
Kosovo, and how these chains of events led to war. The shift from Titoist to nationalist leadership
conveys how the environment in Yugoslavia became predisposed to war. However, this paper
concludes that path dependency theory cannot fully explain how war broke out, as it does not
incorporate human emotions. Therefore, path dependency theory will be complemented by
schismogenesis and armed mobilization theory to explain the shift from an environment predisposed
to war to one engaged in civil war.
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I. Introduction:
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a multi-ethnic state that existed
from the end of World War II to 1992. Following separatist movements that occurred in
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the country erupted in civil war, which spilled into neighboring
Bosnia-Herzegovina more violently in 1992 and in Kosovo in 1999. The Yugoslav Wars
were unprecedented in that violent conflict had returned to Europe for the first time since
World War II, which had ended 46 years earlier. Not only were the wars unprecedented in a
European sense, but also in a Yugoslavian one. While ethnic tensions did exist prior to the
break up of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavians had lived in peace for decades until the onset of war in
1991.
Research Topic: My research will focus on the historical background of ethnic relations
during the final years of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era of
the 1980s and early 1990s. These ethnic relations will be examined in how they fueled
nationalism and the role they played in the Balkan Wars, which began in 1991. This paper
will build upon the path dependency theory, which in this paper seeks to follow the shift from
peace to violence in Yugoslavia. While this social theory explains the political evolution in
Yugoslavia, path dependency theory on its own cannot explain Yugoslavia’s descent into
violence. Therefore, the political conditions that were created via the path dependency theory
will be complemented by the schismogenesis and armed mobilization theories that
incorporate human emotions in explaining the violence that occurred.
Research Question: If Yugoslavia had existed as a peaceful country for several decades,
what then could have caused such a sudden transformation from a peaceful society to one
engaged in violent conflict? Furthermore, how was ethnic identity used specifically to
mobilize war in Yugoslavia?
Significance: The history of Yugoslavia before the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s goes largely
untold. This presents a fundamental problem in understanding how the violence could have
begun in 1991. Without a clear understanding of the ethnic relations before the wars, it
creates a skewed perception of the past that Yugoslavian society was predisposed to war.
This paper seeks to gain a deeper understanding of Yugoslavia and the factors that could have
led to violent conflict. The theories presented in this paper could offer insight into the factors
the cause civil wars more generally.
II. Literature Review: Various social theories and sources will be analyzed and tested in this
paper to determine which theories most accurately convey how violence broke out in
Yugoslavia. The three social theories under review in this paper are path dependency theory,
schismogenesis, and armed mobilization.
Maria Koinova’s path dependency theory will be examined and built upon in this
paper. Her book Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States develops the notion of the
path dependence theory in the context of how events were able to occur in the Balkans in the
1990s. As much of this paper will analyze, the social theory posited in her book provides a
sound basis to how the political conditions developed differently throughout the Yugoslav
republics, but it falls short in explaining the final stage of violence that broke out. Therefore,
the path dependency theory will be complemented with schismogenesis and armed
mobilizations theories that together provide the missing pieces of the puzzle.
Contributor to Neighbors at War, Bette Dennich, points to distortion through the mass
media as one of the primary mechanisms to mobilize the population into war. The author
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builds onto the phenomenon known as “schismogenesis”, a theory developed by Gregory
Bateson, which suggests that media can create an “us” versus “them” environment. The
creation of this toxic and distorted environment creates a skewed perception by the public and
how this mindset develops towards negativity to other groups in society and sees them based
on their perceptions rather than reality. The other group then becomes a threat and the “us”
group the victim (Dennich 2000 47-48). This paper will analyze significant moments in the
media and the amount of violence that erupted as a result. Popular perceptions by
Yugoslavian citizens will also be analyzed. Neighbors at War also builds on the
schismogenesis theory with the observation of Yugoslavians’ reactions to major political
events that played out in the mass media.
Empirical data will also be analyzed throughout to determine what surveys indicated
in regards to feelings held by the public throughout Yugoslavia. The Myth of Ethnic War uses
statistical data from Yugoslavian surveys to determine how against or in favor the public was
toward war. Lastly, areas with more violence will be compared with the degree of tolerance
that was indicated in the surveys to see if any correlations exist. This will draw upon theories
stated by guest speaker Stefano Costalli that ethnic conflict was prevalent in more ethnically
heterogeneous areas.
Historical data and original sources from the time period will also be analyzed to find
what clues can be found in original footage and print in the period leading up to the war.
These sources should be able to provide a first-hand look into the time period to see if
Yugoslavian society was becoming increasingly violent.
III. Thesis: The violence that occurred in the Balkans in the 1990s is less attributable to
preexisting ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, but rather a concerted effort manipulated by
nationalist government elites to fulfill their own agenda. Key electoral events enabled the rise
of nationalist leaders who propagated ethnic disunity, which then led to armed mobilization.
Hypothesis: Yugoslav republics that shifted to nationalist leadership in the final years of the
SFRY developed a higher degree of schismogenesis, and consequently more armed
mobilization and violence, than in Yugoslav republics lacking the shift to nationalist
leadership.
IV. Methodology: To determine the validity of my thesis, I will first do historical
background research to examine the ethnic relations among Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups in the
post-Tito era of the 1980s and early 1990s. The empirical data provided by Yugoslav citizens
will indicate the societal attitudes held at the time and the degree to which societal attitudes
alone can explain the descent into violence.
Second, as stated in the introduction, path dependency theory will be then used to
study the correlation between political changes in Yugoslavia and the degree of violence. The
path dependency is based off four case studies. The case studies presented in the paper are the
wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Third, the role of
schismogenesis will be analyzed by finding correlations between propaganda in media and
ethnic violence. Fourth, Stefan Costelli’s armed mobilization theory will examine the final
stage of the conflict, which moves from ethnic conflict to violence and civil war.
The overall assessment of ethnic relations in Yugoslavia will provide a clearer
understanding of Yugoslavian society before the war. This assessment on Yugoslav society
will then be applied in observing correlations between significant historical events and
incidents of violence that occurred in the country. These observations should be able to
provide a way to measure the degree of violence that occurred in Yugoslavia.
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To contrast with societal opinions in Yugoslavia, I will examine actions taken by
government elites to determine whether or not these actions were a stronger factor in the
violence that broke out beginning in 1991.
V: Analysis of Ethnic Identity in Yugoslavia
In 1986, delegations of Serbs living Kosovo complained to the federal government of
unfavorable living conditions and discrimination by the Albanian majority living in the
autonomous region of Kosovo. This event gained little coverage nationwide (Dennich 46).
However, the discontent among Serbs living in Kosovo gained media attention a year later
when Slobodan Milosevic denounced the treatment of Serbian Kosovar demonstrators
outside a meeting in Kosovo on ethnic tensions in the region (46-47). Serbian nationalists had
actually staged the entire event by throwing rocks at the police first and then claiming that
they were being attacked by the police. Milosevic then condemned the attacks on camera
which was then broadcasted across Serbia (Percy, 11:45-13:15).
Statistics from the 1980s in Serbia debunked many of the preconceived notions that
ethnic Albanians were pushing Serbs out of the province, as they migrated for other reasons,
or that Serbs were disproportionately victims of crimes committed by Albanian Kosovars
(Lazic 1995, 71). Although these statistics showed a decline in the Serb population in
Kosovo, the statistics could easily be misrepresented by Serbian nationalists. This situation
illustrates that the ethnic tensions which may have existed in Kosovo were distorted and
manipulated by Serbian nationalists to pursue their own political agenda. Using the example
of the Serbian Kosovars who petitioned in 1986, which received little media attention, in
contrast to the widely covered “attack” on demonstrators a year later, media played a major
role in how citizens reacted to the events. Citizens across Yugoslavia did not pay much
attention to the ethnic tensions or discrimination in Kosovo prior to this, but when a national
figurehead decried the events, it changed the perception that Yugoslavians had toward ethnic
tension in Yugoslavia.
The Myth of Ethnic War takes a microhistory approach in determining Yugoslav
attitudes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the public’s likelihood to support war. Voter
data from 1990 indicates that, just one year before war broke out in Croatia, voters were more
concerned about the economy than ethnic conflicts (Gagnon 2004, 35). Voting data also
indicates that Serbs living in Croatia voted in large numbers for the League of Communists of
Croatia (SKH) over the Serbian nationalist party (35). This data is astonishing in that it
illustrates how little Serb Croatians were motivated to vote along ethnic lines. Surveys
conducted in 1989 even showed that the vast majority of respondents in both the Croat and
Serb communities in Croatia felt that ethnic relations in their communities were good (35).
When the same respondents were asked about ethnic relations on the national level, their
responses indicated the exact opposite. The majority of Croatians felt that ethnic relations in
Yugoslavia were mostly negative (36). The ethnic tensions in Kosovo that had gained
national attention were likely what came to mind to many of the respondents (36). Although
the majority of Croatians felt that ethnic relations were good, the media attention that
amplified the situation in Kosovo most likely gave Croatians the impressions that ethnic
relations were bad for the most part outside of their republic. More data indicates that Serb
and Croat residents were adamantly apposed to changing the education system into one based
on ethnic lines (38).
Data from Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1989 also provides striking findings that are in
complete antithesis to the violence that broke out there three years later. Over three-quarters
of young Bosnians felt that there was no need to display “caution” towards other ethnic
groups and nearly the same percentage of respondents felt that “division into nations is
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harmful or pointless” (Gagnon 2004, 40). When examining the data in Serbia, the data
supplied by the respondents is much more pessimistic. Only a fifth of respondents felt that
ethnic relations in Serbia were good (44). “According to the findings “…there is little
evidence to support the contention that violence, ethnic cleansing, and a nationalist state were
the top priorities for people in Serbia” (44). The author notes, “[a]gain, as elsewhere, the
impressions of relations at levels higher than those experienced in everyday life are very
heavily influenced by media coverage, which in this period was very much emphasizing the
negative” (44). While Serbs living in Serbia provided a more negative outlook on the ethnic
situation in their republic, their data also shares a commonality with respondents from the
other republics in that they felt low levels of ethnic tension in their daily lives.
Data from the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia interviewed of
13,000 Yugoslavians in 1989 and 1990 on their tolerance towards other Yugoslav ethnicities
(Hodson 1994, 1544). The findings provide a range of opinions in Yugoslavia. While BosniaHerzegovina was the most tolerant of all the republics, the autonomous province of Kosovo
was the least tolerant. The autonomous province of Vojvodina had a high degree of tolerance
among its residents, just behind Bosnia-Herzegovina. Montenegro was slightly more tolerant
than Serbia while Slovenia and Macedonia were less tolerant (1548). This data provides a
wealth of information on the range of opinions in Yugoslavia, but the data does not provide
specific percentages to the questions asked. Therefore, further research will have to be done
to obtain a clearing understanding of societal attitudes in Slovenia, Montenegro and
Macedonia.
The first major uprising in Yugoslavia following Tito’s death was the push for more
autonomy by Albanian Kosovars in 1981. Although the movement was labeled nationalist
because of the regionalist nature of the protests, the movement was actually prompted more
by economic factors than cultural animosity among ethnic groups (Dyker 1996, 94). This
case study indicates how Serbian nationalists were quick to label an economic discontent as
ethnic tension.
Upon the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, the
leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina initially decided to remain part of Yugoslavia (Bougarel 1996,
100). In addition to that, a massive peace demonstration took place in Sarajevo the following
month. The Yutel Concert for Peace in July 1991 drew over 50,000 attendees and thousands
more demonstrated for peace in the streets of Sarajevo. As late as the summer of 1991, many
of the attendees at the concert, who were flying Yugoslavian flags and peace signs in an act
of unity, were under the impression that Bosnia-Herzegovina could still avoid war (ZETRA
2016). Additional statistics from around that time indicate that 100,000 citizens were
conscientious objectors to conscription (Braun et al. 2016). The sheer number of participants
in anti-war demonstrators illustrates that many Bosnians were not inclined towards war and
the statistics gathered from a nationwide survey further supports this argument.
Guest speaker Stefano Costalli in the JMU Balkan lecture series discussed the
locations throughout Yugoslavia with the most violence. His findings indicated that areas
consisting of more heterogenous populations were the locations with the most violence
(Costalli 2017). It is very important, however, to understand that while more ethnically
heterogeneous areas had a positive correlation with more violence, the citizens in those areas
were actually more tolerant of their neighbors and consequently less inclined to become
violent. The citizens of ethnically heterogenous areas of Yugoslavia did not cause more
violence. Instead, other factors need to be examined in why these areas became more violent
and what variable could have played a role.
Factors of ethnicity including language and religion are widely cited as primary
causes of the war. Yugoslavia consisted of three primary religions: Orthodox Christianity,
Roman Catholicism, and Islam. As the data prior data indicates, religious views did not play

5

a major role in relations among ethnic groups in the 1980s. Identity in Yugoslavia based on
religious lines was actually not widely conceptualized until the 1970s when the Yugoslav
government added Muslim to the list of nationalities on the federal census (Poulton 1997,
23). The notion of “imaginary folklore” is described in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State.
This theory stipulates that elites, through revisionist history, promoted this idea of deeprooted hatred among the various religious groups in Yugoslavia (27). While religious
differences and warfare may have existed in the distant past, religion was not a prominent
cleavage in society that divided Yugoslavians.
Another scholar presents a similar argument on the role of religion and history in the
Balkans. Ethnic struggles between the Serbs and Croats, which had existed, were dramatized
by nationalists in the final years of Yugoslavia; “ …in former Yugoslavia, popular
perceptions of the past are infinitely more important than what may or may not have actually
taken place” (Bennett 1995, 6). It is quite astonishing that centuries-old historical myths and
legends prompted such a strong sense of nationalism among Yugoslavians.
Following the decision of the Slovenian parliament in September 1989 to incorporate
language into its constitution for the right to become independent, comedians in the country
satirized the move in a broadcast seen around the country (Dennich 2000, 39-40).
“Throughout Yugoslavia, a significant proportion of the population rejected nationalist views
in favor of maintaining a multiethnic state” (40). This quote demonstrates that many
Yugoslavians had an awareness of the disconnect between government aspirations and what
ordinary citizens were in support of.
VI: Path Dependency Theory and the Break Out of Violence
The first part of this paper examined societal attitudes among Yugoslav ethnic groups
in the post-Tito era during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The findings indicate that the vast
majority of Yugoslavians at that time had a largely positive attitude toward other ethnic
groups or an indifferent attitude at worst. Very few respondents felt animosity toward other
Yugoslav ethnic groups. Data from the surveys did indicate, however, that a large percentage
of Yugoslavians “perceived” that there was a high degree of ethnic tension outside their
communities. These findings present a puzzle in determining how the citizens of Yugoslavia
were then capable of the violence that came about beginning in 1991. If citizens of
Yugoslavia had an overwhelmingly favorable opinion towards the other Yugoslav ethnic
groups, what then could have caused the citizens to become violent towards one another?
The second part of this paper will examine the path dependency theory that can help
explain how citizens became engaged in violence. Path dependence theory suggests that this
is a pattern that occurs during regime change and consequently, provided a “window of
opportunity” for violence to occur. Path-dependence theory seeks to help explain historical
outcomes by emphasizing the interconnectedness of key events throughout time. The theory
posits that in order for something to happen, a specific preceding event or condition had to
first occur. Since similar situations can end with different outcomes, the path-dependence
theory utilizes the notion of “critical junctures” to illustrates the differences or “trajectories”
that occur (Koinova 2013, 6-7).
In the context of Yugoslavia, “…multiple changes in the political and economic
environment enabled contingent events to have major consequences” (Koinova 2013, 5).
Using the path-dependency theory, the chain of events leading to outbreak of violence in
Yugoslavia will have to be reconstructed followed by examining whether the “critical
junctures” are able to illustrate how violence was able to occur in some instances.
Chain of Events in Yugoslavia
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Building onto Koinova’s path-dependency theory, the first “critical juncture” was the
decline of communism in the 1980s (Koinova 2013, 7). When Tito died in 1980, there was an
initial wave of pessimism if the multiethnic socialist federation would be able to continue.
Many feared that Yugoslavia would collapse, as Tito was a key figure in maintaining unity
among the various ethnic groups. The post-Tito leadership was adamant in preserving a
united, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in the initial years following Tito’s death and prosecuted any
dissent in order to maintain unity. The path dependence theory shows that Tito’s death did
not actually cause a critical juncture in Yugoslavia because Tito’s successors maintained his
policies thereby preventing a political climate that could have opened to violent actors. As
noted in the Associated Press newsclip, “Tito’s basic policy line remains unchanged”
(Associated Press 1981, Roving Report Yugoslavia, 03:00-03:05). At the same time, ethnic
tensions did become visible following Tito’s death in Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians
protested the bleak economic conditions in the region. Although the demonstrations did form
on ethnic lines, the demonstrations themselves were addressing the local economic
grievances in Kosovo and were not promoting ethnic disunity in Yugoslavia (Associated
Press 1981, 07:40-08:0).
It would be several more years before a chain of events unfolded that resulted in civil
war in Yugoslavia. Instead of critical juncture forming upon Tito’s death in 1980 or the
protests in Kosovo in 1981, the critical juncture did not occur until a non-Communist voices
entered the political field. It was not the decline of communism that fostered violence, rather
communism’s decline provided a new “window of opportunity” for violent actors to gain
access onto the political stage. During the Tito years and the immediate years following his
death “…there were no alternative elites. In the 1980s new elites within the communist
parties started to emerge” (Koinova 2013, 40). The critical juncture in Yugoslavia was
therefore not in 1980, but in 1987 with the political shakeup that brought nationalists into
power over the pro-Yugoslavs. In response to the growing ethnic unrest in Kosovo, an
ideological split occurred among the Serbian Communist Party. The then-ruler of the Serbian
Communist Party, Ivan Stambolic, denounced the nationalist rhetoric coming from his own
party’s opposition and tried to handle the crisis through peaceful negotiations with his
Kosovar Albanian counterparts. President Stambolic was unable to achieve this goal and
resigned. This “critical juncture” resulted in a power shift to nationalist faction of the Serbian
Communist Party led by Slodoban Milosevic (41).
Following the path dependence theory, the abandonment of Tito-style communism in
the mid-1980s enabled the emergence of alternative ideologies within the Serbian Communist
Party to emerge, which then enabled nationalist politicians to obtain power. It is important to
emphasize that the abandonment of Tito-style communism did not just result in nationalists
coming to power. Instead, the abandonment of Tito-style communism allowed for a variety of
alternative political ideologies to develop on the national political scene. Alternative political
ideologies emerged in the other Yugoslav republics. In Slovenia, the Communist party did
not transform into a nationalist party, but rather liberal reformists.
The chain of events in Socialist Republic of Slovenia differed considerably from the
Socialist Republic of Serbia. The same year that Slobodan Milosevic became President of the
Serbian Communist Party, the reformist Milan Kucan became President of the Slovenian
Communist Party (121-122). This was a “critical juncture” in Slovenia’s history as “[t]he
ascent of the liberal wing was a key development in the Slovenian ‘proto-transition’…that
shaped the path to liberalism” (Boduszynski 2010, 121). Using the path dependence
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approach, the 1986 power shift of the Slovenian Communist Party was a key event that great
affected the outcome of Slovenia in the early 1990s. Had the power shift also turned
nationalist in Slovenia in 1986, instead of liberal, Slovenia’s path may have been more in line
with Serbia’s. Evidence of Slovenia’s reforms was apparent in its press. In the latter half of
the 1980s, Slovenia strayed from Titoism in allowing freedom of the press that challenged
Yugoslav policies. The magazine Mladina became an outspoken critic of Yugoslav and
Milosevic’s policies (Percy 1995, 31:15-31:45).
The decline of Titoism ushered in the emergence of alternative voices, which led to
two very different outcomes, a nationalist Serbia and a liberal Slovenia. In keeping with the
path dependency theory, these two conditions are essential in the next piece of the puzzle: the
transformation from a peaceful society to a violent one. Until 1991, ethnic violence had not
yet erupted into warfare, but the critical junctures of the path dependence theory enabled
violence to break out.
Outbreak of Violence in Slovenia
The initial warfare that broke out in Yugoslavia was not in nationalist Serbia, but in
liberal Slovenia. Slovenia had paid close attention to the developments on the ethnic situation
in Kosovo and in 1989 there was widespread condemnation of Serbia’s “domination in
Kosovo” (Associated Press 1989a, 00:30-00:45). The Slovenian leader Milan Kucan foresaw
that Serbia’s growing power throughout Yugoslavia put Slovenia at risk (Percy 1995, 23:5524:30). Relations further diminished between the Slovenian and Serbian republics in January
1990 at the 14th Yugoslav Communist Party Congress. When upset with the Serbian
delegation’s behavior, the Slovene delegation of the Yugoslavian Communist Party walked
out (44:00-44:45). Slovenia’s political objectives had strayed so far from Serbia’s that
Slovenia saw it in its best interest to sever its ties with the Yugoslav Communist Party.
The declaration of secession is what ultimately triggered the outbreak violence in
Slovenia. The Yugoslav People’s Army quickly moved troops in from Belgrade to stop the
secession. After ten days of fighting, the European Community, Yugoslavia, and Slovenia
brokered a 90-day ceasefire to put an end to all the violence (Wilmer 2002, 46-47). The first
instance of warfare to break out in Yugoslavia was in Slovenia, though the case of Slovenia
presents a separate narrative to the other Yugoslav republics. While ethnicity may have
played some role in the Ten-Day War, the actual warfare that took place in Slovenia involved
very few civilians and was mainly fought between the Yugoslav’s People Army and
separatists in the newly-formed Slovenian military. The example of Slovenia shows that
ethnic hatred played almost no role in this conflict. Therefore, the critical juncture that
occurred in Slovenia in 1986 and the subsequent actions to liberalize instead of nationalize
demonstrate the validity of the path-dependence theory in this argument.
Outbreak of Violence in Croatia
In contrast to Slovenia, the violence in Croatia was more severe. Serb areas of Croatia
had actually begun to reject Croatian control in what became known as the “log revolution”
(Glardic 2011, 193). The Socialist Republic of Serbia was instrumental in this affair as the
Serbian State Security Service “armed and trained” the Serb Croat revolt (193). Instead of
trying to secede from Yugoslavia altogether, the Serb Croats were instead looking to unite
with the Socialist Republic of Serbia.
Croatia was not immune to the changes occurring elsewhere in Yugoslavia during the
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1980s. While the League of Communists of Croatia did not pivot to the degree seen in
Slovenia, alternative voices did enter the political scene in the late 1980s. Croatia’s critical
juncture, however, did not occur until 1990, when the republic held its first multiparty
elections (Gagnon 2004, 136). The election resulted in a victory for the Croatian Democratic
Union, (HDZ), (136). This meant a departure from communism and the emergence of
nationalism. The new leader of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, (138). Tudjman’s political party
contained a radical nationalist faction with an anti-Serb agenda. This wing of the party
contained members loyal to the former “Ustasa”, a fascist organization that collaborated with
the Nazis during World War II (138). Aware of the radical elements in his party, Tudjman
was able to distance himself, and it was his watered-down nationalism attracted the most
voters (138). Given that nationalism did exist in Croatia, more so than in Slovenia, but less
powerful than in Serbia, the degree of violence seen in Croatia was in between the level seen
in Slovenia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The 1990 “Log Revolution” was the first instance of violence in Croatia. Unlike the
Ten-Day War in Slovenia in 1991 with low civilian involvement, Croatia eventually fell into
civil war. Like other republics in Yugoslavia, Croatia was also subjected to increasing proSerbian propaganda (Gagnon 2004, 136). Many Serb Croats living in the republic felt
alienated by the new Croatian government, which used the same nationalist symbols used by
the Croatian government that collaborated with the Nazis during World War II (Percy 1995,
52:00-53:20). In reaction to this sentiment, President Tudjman stated that all ethnic groups in
Croatia would be treaty equally (138). Despite the fact that Croatian Democratic Union had
far-right elements in its party, the majority of Croatians separated the mainly moderate
nationalist makeup of the party from the extreme fringe and continued to support equal rights
for Serb Croats. (154-156). The ambiguity surrounding the Croatian symbolism and its
nationalism in general was nonetheless used by Serbia to fulfill its own agenda of taking
control over Serb areas in Croatia. Warfare then broke out between the Croatia and Yugoslav
People’s Army (Percy 1995, 1:35:00-1:35:45).
Outbreak of Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered the most violence of any of the Yugoslav republics. The
republic consisted of three main ethnic groups: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and
Bosnian Croats. Unlike the leadership in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian leaders were still
negotiating future ties with Yugoslavia into 1992. Without Slovenia and Croatia in the
federation, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic concluded that Serbia would dwarf BosniaHerzegovina in a smaller Yugoslavia and therefore called for a referendum to take place on
independence on February 29, 1992 (Glardic 2011, 289).
The referendum resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence, though Bosnian
Serbs had boycotted the referendum. This became a “critical juncture” in the future of
Bosnia-Herzegovina as the referendum was followed by civilian violence (Glardic 2011,
292). After a Bosnian Muslim killed a Bosnian Serb at a wedding in Sarajevo, the city and
republic immediately broke out in widespread ethnic violence. Using the death of the
Bosnian Serb, SDS Party Chairman Kardzic demanded the deployment of Serb paramilitaries
in Sarajevo. These paramilitary groups quickly engaged in fighting and sought to obtain as
much territory as possible for the Bosnian Serbs throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Violence in
the Balkans reached a new level when Serb paramilitary groups engaged in ethnic cleansing
by massacring Bosnian Muslim areas as was done in March and April 1992 in the Bosnian
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town of Bijeljina (296). The horrors that unfolded in Bosnia continued until the Dayton
Agreement was signed in late 1995 and brought an end to the war.
Outbreak of Violence in Kosovo
The outbreak of violence in Kosovo differs considerably from the chronology of
violence in the aforementioned Yugoslav republics. Path dependency can help explain this
phenomenon through the key political events that occurred in the province. These key events
in Kosovo were dramatically different from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
consequently the timelines of events differs as well.
Although war broke out in Kosovo last, ethnic tensions were first heightened in this
part of Yugoslavia. In 1981, one year after Tito’s death, student demonstrators in Kosovo
protested the poor economic conditions. In addition, some protestors also demanded that the
semiautonomous province become a Yugoslav republic and share the same degree of
autonomy as the six republics (Bieber 2003, 2). As the decade progressed, Kosovar Serbs
increasingly claimed that they were being discriminated against and filed reports of defaced
churches and being violently attacked (15). Whatever tension or discrimination that may have
existed, Slobodan Milosevic, the new President of the Serbia, used this tense social
environment as a window of opportunity to fulfill his nationalist agenda of creating a
“Greater Serbia”. Amidst civil unrest in Kosovo, the Serbian parliament revoked the
autonomous status of Kosovo in March 1989 (Vetter 1999, 543-544). This was a critical
juncture for Kosovo as the majority-Albanian population there was no longer able to use
political institutions and mechanisms to gain greater autonomy or participate meaningfully in
local affairs.
After war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fear increased among Kosovar Albanians
that Serbs would wage war on them next (Associated Press 1992, 04:45-05:00). By fall 1992,
societal conditions had reached an all time low in Kosovo as ethnic Albanians were banned
from attending school. The Serb-dominated government, which had overturned Kosovo’s
autonomous status three years prior, made it difficult and politically not feasible for ethnic
Albanians to protest (00:00-00:35). The general atmosphere in Kosovo during the early and
mid-1990s was one of a police state where Albanian Kosovars were attacked and monitored
as a method of intimidation to any dissent against the Serb-dominated government (00:4501:30). Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo during this time escape the
Serbian ethnic cleansing policy (04:50-05:05).
The situation changed in Kosovo during the mid-1990s after the Dayton Accords
were signed in late 1995. While the Dayton Accords brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the accords were adamantly opposed by many Kosovar Albanians, who believed that the
treaty would keep the territorial boundaries of Yugoslavia intact. This critical juncture in
Kosovo resulted in the mobilization of ethnic Albanians into an underground organization
known as the Kosova Liberation Army who aimed to achieve Kosovar independence through
violent means. After international peace talks failed, NATO intervened in Yugoslavia in 1999
and brought the war to a close after three months of military engagement (Bieber 2003, 41).
Estimates indicate that more than 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed in the war and
hundreds of thousands more displaced (Vetter 1999, 568).
The Emotional Component to Path Dependency Theory
The path dependency theory has thus far explained how the political environment
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changed in Yugoslavia, and consequently, how nationalism was able to permeate throughout
the country. The rise of nationalist leaders cannot fully explain how the country erupted in
violence as civilians, and not just politicians and the military, engaged in the violence.
Building upon the path dependency theory, schismogenesis was the development of the
hostile social environment created by the rise of nationalist leaders.
Schismogenesis
Following the political upheaval and chain of events in Serbia in 1987, Milosevic’s
rise coincided with the rise in nationalist media. Using the media to his advantage, Milosevic
systematically changed the nature of popular media outlets through personnel changes and
reorganization, as was the case with the Serbian newspaper Politika and the television station
Radio Televizija Beograd (Bozik-Roberson 2005, 400). What were originally considered
reputable sources, media outlets such as Radio Televizija Beograd, became mouthpieces for
Serb nationalist propaganda (401-402). The shift in media in Serbian society to nationalist
propaganda created an environment where “…the psycho-cultural power of ethnicity is
turned into a source of hatred and stereotyping that can ultimately be mobilized into a violent
conflict” (405).
Nationalist propaganda throughout the other Yugoslav republics during the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Tudjman’s nationalist government in Croatia embarked on a renaming
policy in 1990 with the dismantling of Titoist references in favor of Croatian symbolism,
much of which had fascist “Ustashe” connotations that aimed to further divide Croats and
Serbs (Dennich 2000, 52-53). This policy by the new government in Croatia is another
example of elite-driven “schismogenesis” that unfortunately led into future armed
mobilization in Croatia.
Armed Mobilization
Taking human emotions into account, armed mobilization theory follows the negative
hostile social environment created through “schismogenesis”. As noted in Stefano Costalli’s
article on armed mobilization, “…political scientists have (re)discovered the importance of
introducing ideas and emotions into explanations for internal armed conflict” (Costalli and
Ruggeri 2015, 119). Path dependency explains the descent into violence in Yugoslavia by
showing the rise in nationalist leadership, but it cannot explain how Yugoslavian citizens
became engaged in violence. Therefore, schismogenesis helps explain how the nationalist
leadership negatively Yugoslavian society. After the negative environment was created
through schismogenesis, it negatively affects human emotions.
In the case of Yugoslavia, many citizens of the country developed the feeling of
indignation. This feeling differs from anger in that the emotion causes citizens to react
against society at large instead of a single person of perpetrator. Those consumed with
indignation therefore feel that they are defending and acting on behalf of those who are
thought to have been victimized (128). Indignation, however, does not fully explain the
breakout in violence as Costalli’s article explains that those subjected to the “unfair”
environment must adhere to a new ideology that calls for violence against the “aggressors”
(129).
Armed mobilization is the final step in how Yugoslavia evolved from a peaceful
society to one consumed by violent conflict. Like the aforementioned path dependency
theory, schismogenesis and armed mobilization theories also illustrate the path needed for
violence to break out. In the case of the armed mobilization theory, a feeling of indignation
that evolves into ideological revenge helps explain the descent to violence and civil war in a
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country.
VI. Conclusion
The path dependency theory, augmented by schismogenesis and armed mobilization
theory conveys how Yugoslavia went from a peaceful society to a violent one in such a short
period of time.
The path dependency theory, which looks at the “critical junctures” in Yugoslavia’s
political leadership, illustrates how Yugoslavian society abandoned Titoism in favor of other
political ideologies. The departure of Titoism was not a resurfacing of ethnic tensions, but
rather an introduction of a variety of ideologies in Yugoslavia. While nationalism became
dominant in Serbia and Croatia, the case studies indicate that a shift to liberalism in Slovenia
and a commitment Yugoslav unity in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the referendum on
independence in 1992. Path dependency and the case study of Kosovo illustrate how the
delay in major political leadership changes in Kosovo ultimately delayed the outbreak of
violence in that region until the late 1990s.
Because the Balkan Wars of the 1990s involved not only government and military
officials, schismogenesis adds to the path dependency approach in explaining how the
nationalist political environment affected Yugoslavian citizens. In addition, armed
mobilization theory ultimately explains the change in human emotions that shifted ethnic
relations from hostile to violent.
In conclusion, path dependency accurately illustrates how the change in political
leadership in the various republics of the SFRY towards nationalism shows a positive
correlation in the amount of violence experienced by that republic in the 1990s. This paper
also shows how cultural differences such as language and religion played very little role in
these conflicts, not only because of surveys documented in the late 1980s, but also because of
how path dependency led to an environment of schismogenesis and eventually armed
mobilization.
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Appendix:
Path Dependency in Yugoslavia
League of Communists of Slovenia
January 1990: League of Communists of Slovenia gives up its monopoly. Slovenia
severs ties with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Vetter 1999).
4 February 1990. League of Communists of Slovenia becomes Party of Democratic
Reform (544)
7 March 1990 Socialist Republic of Slovenia becomes Rep. of Slovenia (544)
8 April 1990/22 April 1990: Multiparty elections in Slovenia. Milan Kucan becomes
president with 58% of popular vote. (544)
June 1991: Slovenia proclaims independence from Yugoslavia (547)
League of Communists of Serbia
May 1986 – 3 September 1987: Ivan Stambolic (Titoist) is President of Serbia
(Wetter, 542)
3 September 1987: Slobodan Milosevic (Nationalist) becomes President of Serbia
through an internal party election (542).
16 July 1990: Slobodan Milosevic renames League of Communists of Serbia, which
becomes Socialist Party of Serbia, and maintains position (545).

League of Communists in Croatia
22-23 April/6-7 May 1990: After two rounds of elections, Franjo Tudjman of the
Croatian Democratic Party (nationalist) becomes president of Croatia (Vetter, 544)
June 1991: Croatia proclaims independence from Yugoslavia (547)
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League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina
November 1990: Multiparty elections on ethnic lines. Izetbegovic becomes Bosnian
President (545-546)
29 February 1992: Bosnia-Herzegovina referendum (549)
1 March 1992: Violence begins after Serb shot and killed (549)
3 March 1992: Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaims independence (549)
Kosovo
March 1989: Kosovo loses semiautonomous status (Vetter 1999, 543-544).
1995: Dayton Agreement raises unrest in Kosovo and coincides with the creation of
the Kosova Liberation Army (Bieber 2003, 41).
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